This paper investigates what information water resource managers think they need to make decisions on climate change adaptation. This is achieved through a hypothetical case study where participants, all actual water resource managers or in research, practitioner or administration roles linked to Australian water resources management, were given theoretical future climate scenarios and asked to make decisions based on the available information. The case study provided useful insights into why there is little evidence of effective climate change adaptation being implemented despite significant advances in climate impacts and adaptation science over the last decade. It was found that in order to bridge the gap between climate change adaptation recommendations and successful implementation at practitioner level there is a demand for: improved translation, communication and packaging of existing climate science information into sector-and locationspecific impacts (e.g. hydrological interpretation of climate model rainfall projections and the associated uncertainties); attribution of historical and future hydroclimatic changes (e.g. not just what has happened or is going to happen but why and the confidence and likelihoods surrounding that); quantification of costs and benefits of any decision; and understanding of the social, political, and environmental contexts and level of acceptance associated with any decision.
INTRODUCTION
Successful adaptation outcomes are supported by decision making that is informed by the best available climate science that uncertainty associated with climate science is not adequately quantified and communicated or that the climate information is simply 'too uncertain' to be of any practical use. Due to high uncertainty surrounding precipitation projections this disconnect is emphasised within the Australian water resource management and agricultural sectors and has been identified as a major barrier preventing well documented facts, themes and recommendations from being translated into successful adaptation outcomes (e.g. Ziervogel & Downing ; Kiem et al. a, b; Ziervogel the opinion that uncertainty needs to be reduced in order to develop effective adaptation strategies and it is still often the case that uncertainty is used as a reason (or excuse) to operate under 'business as usual'. This is important as some decision makers may be waiting for uncertainty in climate information to reduce before they take action on adaptation and risk planning. However, this reduction in uncertainty may never eventuate, or may happen long after the optimum time for action.
Traditionally, in carrying out research on humaninduced climate change and its impacts, scientists have followed a pathway that starts with the specification of greenhouse-gas emissions and ends with possible impacts and possible response strategies. From the perspective of high-level policy and decision makers through to practitioners working on implementing adaptation strategies, the problem is that each step in this pathway has an associated uncertainty. More importantly, these uncertainties compound at each step meaning that by the time the step of projecting climate change impacts at spatial scales relevant for decision making is reached, the uncertainties have exploded (e.g. Jones ; Brown & Wilby ).
Despite the significant advances made in the climate science and adaptation field, as well as the science-policypractice interface, operationalising scientific knowledge for robust and successful climate change adaptation policy or decision making remains a challenge, and numerous studies exist that demonstrate or speculate why (e.g. It is acknowledged that many studies exist that focus on trans-and multi-disciplinarity, co-production of knowledge and the need for translating scientific knowledge into practical knowledge (and how best to do it), but previous research (e.g. Ziervogel (both impacts and adaptation science) over the last decade. We also discuss (below under the section 'Lessons learned from the hypothetical case study') how the situation might be improved to increase the actual occurrence (i.e. at the practitioner or industry level) of successful climate change adaptation in the water resources sector in Australia.
METHOD
The research question is addressed using a hypothetical case study, conducted during a workshop associated with the NCCARF 'Decision making under uncertainty' project (www.nccarf.edu.au/publications/decision-making-underuncertainty). Climate scientists and water resource managers (or researchers, practitioners or administrators working in roles linked to water resources management) were brought together for a 2-day (12-13 April 2012) workshop in Canberra, Australia, to discuss decision making under uncertainty and the gap that currently exists between the information that climate science provides and the information that is practically useful for water resource management. The overall aims of the workshop were to:
• improve climate scientists' understanding about what climate information is required by water resource managers and what format the information needs to be provided in;
• improve water resource managers' understanding of what information climate science can currently provide, the limitations of the science and the uncertainties associated with the outputs;
• develop a better understanding of what climate science can realistically be expected to provide over the next 5-10 years and what probably will never be possible;
• learn about the decision making process and how uncertainty is currently dealt with. Table 1 shows a list of workshop participants and their role within their respective organisations. Participants were a mix of climate scientists and researchers, high-level civil servants and senior experts in government agencies, or industry practitioners involved in water resources management in Australia. No participants were politically elected officials and as such the term 'decision making' refers to decisions made at the practitioner level rather than the higher-level policy decisions (although many of the participants regularly provide advice and information to politically elected officials and so were very familiar with the high-level decision making process).
Workshop participants (Table 1) To ensure independence and decrease the potential for bias, the workshop was conducted by professional and experienced facilitators from Global Learning (for more information see www.globallearning.com.au/) rather than members of the project team (i.e. authors of this paper).
The computer software iMEET! (www.imeet.com.au/ public/) was also used at the workshop to increase productivity and efficiency during the workshop and afterwards when reporting. The iMEET! software captures discussions and makes the information available immediately, allowing rapid organisation, analysis, evaluation and evolution of ideas. This style of facilitation ensured all participants were given the opportunity to voice their concerns but had the added benefit of preventing discussion being dominated by a limited number of individuals. The first day of the workshop and the first session of the second day covered water resource managers' experiences in using climate information and also involved several leading climate scientists giving their views on the 'state of climate science and its application in Australia'. The final sessions of the second day were devoted to decision making under uncertainty and included investigating differences in participants' perceptions on knowledge and uncertainty (see Kiem et al. () for details), a hypothetical case study on decision making under uncertainty, and a wrap-up session where the key themes that emerged were discussed and given priority rankings.
The focus of this paper is the hypothetical case study which required all participants to engage in an interactive exercise that highlighted the information required and different methods water resource managers use to make decisions, even when faced with significant uncertainties.
As such, the aims and results of this paper represent a subset of the goals and outcomes of the overall workshop.
Specifically, the aim of the hypothetical case study was to gain insights into the following:
• What information water resource managers think they need to make decisions.
• How water resource managers make decisions and how climate scientists think water resource managers make decisions.
• If decisions change given different circumstances or additional information, and if so, what are the implications of this?
• Both during and after an event, how people assess whether the decision made was a success or failure.
• Strengths and weaknesses of current or traditional water resource management approaches.
All participants (i.e. both climate scientists and water resource managers) were told to consider themselves as water resource managers belonging to an urban coastal water authority in the year 2012. In Phase 1 of the hypothetical case study, participants were told that the best information strongly indicated that population and associated demand on water resources were projected to increase and annual average rainfall (and water availability) was projected to decrease such that supply probably will not meet demand 20 years from now (see Figure 1 ).
Given this information participants were then asked:
• What information do you need to decide on options for adaptation?
• What are your options for ensuring the region does not run out of water (or at least prolonging or decreasing the chance of that situation occurring)?
• • If you have to make a decision now what would it be and how did you use the information available to you?
Once responses to Phase 1 questions had been entered into iMEET! (and locked so no editing could take place as extra information became available), Phase 2 of the hypothetical case study required participants to imagine that it was now 2020 (i.e. almost a decade after the previous decisions were made) and the following extra information was now available:
• Whatever option you decided on in 2012 is now well on the way to being implemented; • Eight of the last 10 years have seen above average rainfall and extensive flooding in your region and people are beginning to question the need for recycled water or desalination plants.
• • Of the information you thought you needed, if it had been provided would you have actually been able to make a better decision? • Rate your decisions at the two points in time as you would if you were at 2030 and reflecting back.
RESULTS
Hypothetical case study -Phase 1: decisions made at 2012 for 2030 Figure 3 summarises the participant responses made during Phase 1 (illustrated in Figure 1 ) of the hypothetical situation described above. A key insight to emerge was that despite the limited and vague information given, all participants were able to identify options to address the situation and all participants were able to make a decision. The comments in Figure 4 and To determine the priority actions emerging from the hypothetical case study, participants were presented with a list of issues that arose throughout the exercise and were Table 3 lists the issues that were voted on sorted to indicate the most popular (i.e. highest priority) issues at the top. Table 3 ). This issue arose on multiple occasions throughout the hypothetical case study and it is clear that guidance needs to be developed in order for end-users to integrate this into their climate impact assessment and adaption processes -in particular how the natural variability might change.
Development of tools and methods to integrate between
climate change projections and decision making, and the social, political, and environmental contexts and level of acceptance associated with any decision (highlighted in blue in Table 3 The second issue relating to baseline risk, non-stationarity and variability requires advances both in the research and the translation of the research into practical guidelines. • Good decisions were made, these were: keeping options open; minimising large premature commitments; maintaining alertness to both demand and supply side management
• We had done well as we had made a reasonably robust and defendable decision on information at the time and provided for long-term resilience through integrated water management and climate-independent options in addition to increasing liveability and improving aquatic eco system health. However, just because we think it is the right decision(s) does not necessarily mean it is the 'best' decision. For example, the most efficient decision would have been to ride it out, but this would have promoted a wait-and-see response to climate that would not lead to efficient longer-term decisions and would not have gained other benefits of integrated water management
• 2012: A bit risky to leave it to the community, especially as they might take the 'soft option' of avoiding costly infrastructure (in this case it would have paid off but that is just luck). Perhaps some small-scale infrastructure investment would have been more sensible. 2020: Lucky again that, despite high rainfall for recent years, the community accepted a moratorium on growth/ development to preserve the town's water supply
• The relatively low cost of a small but expandable desalination plant would have been a favoured option throughout unless mitigating factors (e.g. a lack of public/political support) had been found
• The decisions made would not have been perfect but the decision making process would rate highly. We did not run out of water so we get our annual bonus!!
• Satisfactory at both points in time 
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The need for 'knowledge broker' to fill the space between developers of climate science information and application of that information by end-users 7
The requirement for dialogue between providers and end-users to bridge the gap effectively. This is an extremely complex, time-consuming and resource intensive task which has not been factored into any plans or strategies 6 Greater consideration of baseline risk and accounting for non-stationarity when developing climate projections During the hypothetical case study it was clear that uncertainty means different things to different people -with some scientists particularly stressing the difference between uncertainty, precision and accuracy. Water resource manager understanding of uncertainty may not have changed due to the hypothetical case study. However, some water resource managers felt they had gained 'better clarity through technical definitions'. From a climate scientist perspective, while views on uncertainty also did not necessarily change, the importance of non-climate-related uncertainty was reinforced (and in some cases introduced). This is a satisfactory result as prior to the hypothetical case study water resource managers said that one thing that would make the exercise valuable is 'an appreciation that climate change adaptation is based on more than just climate'. Based on the following comments given by scientists after the hypothetical case study it seems that this was achieved:
'The hypothetical case study exercise exceeded expectations.
It was thought-provoking and led to a better understanding of the issues facing decision makers, especially that the uncertainties are not just in the science' (Scientist).
'The hypothetical case study reinforced my view on uncertainty and reinforced that climate change uncertainty is not the only uncertainty and not always the most important' (Scientist).
'I still tend to view uncertainty the same as before the hypothetical case study with respect to climate change projections. However, I now recognise that there are political, social and demographic issues affecting decision makers that may be of equal or greater magnitude than scientific uncertainty' (Scientist).
Another insight to emerge from the hypothetical case study was that water resource managers recognise that there is and always will be irreducible uncertainty associated with climate forecasts and climate change projections in Australia, and that effective climate change adaptation must be able to prepare for and 
